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MIGRATORY DIVORCE: CHAPTERS III AND IV
THE APPEARANCE OF SHERRER AND
THE GHOST OF HADDOCK _
M NRAD G. PAULSEN*

"FullFaith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedingsshall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."1
"And the said records and judicial proceedings, so
authenticated,shall have such faith and credit given to them
in every court within the United States as they have by law or2
usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken."
The mandatory out-of-state effects of a state's divorce decree depend upon the interpretation which the Supreme Court
of the United States gives to the foregoing constitutional provision and the Statute of 1790. Although the Court has had to
deal with these propositions throughout its history, its contribution toward the solution of domestic relations problems arising thereunder has not been impressive. The opinions of the
Supreme Court as to family law have seemed like episodes in
some long judicial soap opera, each one advancing the plot to
a degree, but also posing a new set of questions to be resolved
upon the next occasion.
A combination of three American legal propositions has
operated to make the problem of "migratory divorce" a phenomenon peculiar to the United States: a) A wife can secure
a domicil 3 different from that of her husband;4 b) A state
A.B. 1940, University of Chicago; J.D. 1942, University of Chicago.
Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
2. 1 STAT. 122 (1790), 28 U. S. C. § 687 (1946).
3. A definition of domicil, approved by the Supreme Court of the
United States, was contained in the charge to the jury in the
second Williams case. "Domicil . . . was that place where a
person 'has voluntarily fixed his abode ... not for a mere special
or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it
his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited
length of time.'" Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 236
(1945).
4. RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1934). In England a
married woman retains the domicil of her husband even if she has
obtained a decree of judicial separation from him. CHEsmE,
PRrVATE INTEmATIONAL LAw 237 (3d ed. 1947).
*
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which is the domicil of one of the parties to a marriage will
grant a divorce ;5 and c) The divorcing state applies its own
substantive law of divorce.8 With these propositions in mind
unhappily married persons who live in states which have strict
policies about divorce are tempted to take advantage of the
more liberal laws of another state by removing themselves
briefly to the more favorable state and, in that jurisdiction,
carefully building up evidence of the mental state necessary to
domicil.
The earliest full faith and credit cases which involve divorce, drawing largely upon the ordinary principles of conflict
of laws, have made domicil, as the jurisdictional basis for divorce, a part of the federal scheme for mandatory recognition
of divorce decrees.7 Full faith and credit need not be given to
a decree of divorce unless the decree is granted by the state
of domicil.8 But whose domicil? A marriage involves two,
and the parties may well be domiciled in different states.
Cheever v. Wilson,9 made it clear that a divorce was entitled to
full faith and credit if the state granting it was the domicil of
one party and the other spouse had made a personal appearance in the proceeding. According to Andrews v. Andrews,1
the parties to a divorce, neither of whom is domiciled in the
divorcing state, cannot by their mutual consent confer such
jurisdiction on a court that the ensuing decree must be given
full faitl and credit. The doctrine of res judicata apparently
did not prevent a party from attacking F.'s divorce decree in
F211 on a jurisdictional ground even though both spouses had
5. E.g., "Bills for divorce may be brought against defendants residing out of the state, and service shall be effected upon them
as in other cases in chancery." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.06 (1941).
The law of the jurisdiction further provides: "In order to obtain
a divorce the complainant must have resided ninety (90) days in
the State of Florida before the filing of the bill of complaint."
Id. at § 65.02.
6.

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 135

(1934).

7. See, e.g., Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901); Bell v. Bell,
181 U. S. 175 (1901); Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179
(1901).

8.
9.
10.
11.-

Bell v. Bell; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, supra note 7.
9 Wall. 108 (U. S. 1869).
188 U. S. 14 (1903).
F represents the state which has granted a decree of divorce.
F2 is the state in which the F1 proceeding is challengid. The
terminology is taken from

CHEATHAm,

DOWLING,

GooDRicH AND
12 (2d

GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIAILS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS

ed. 1942).
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appeared in the divorce proceeding and could have litigated
the jurisdictional question. After the famous case of Haddock
v. Haddock,12 if merely one party appeared before the divorcing court only the state of the "matrimonial domicil" had
power to grant a divorce binding in other states. Davis v.
Davis,"3 has modified the Andrews case: If the parties to a
marriage appear in the divorce suit and actually litigate the
jurisdictional question of domicil, they are bound by the decision. The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to litigated
questions of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
In Williams I' 4 the Supreme Court confessed the error of
its opinion in Haddock v. Haddock. Any state in which either
of the parties to a marriage is domiciled has the power to
grant a divorce entitled to full faith and credit. Williams 1i 5
allows the jurisdictional question of domicil to be litigated in
F 2, in the case of an ex parte decree, in spite of a formal finding as to domicil by the courts of F.. Four cases decided by
the Supreme Court during the October term, 1947,16 have
added two new chapters to the nation's oldest family serial.
CHAPTER III:

THE APPEARANCE OF SHERRER

After about fourteen years of marriage to Edward G.
Sherrer, Margaret E. Sherrer left Massachusetts, on April 3,
1944, for what appeared to be a vacation in Florida. Shortly
after her arrival in Florida, Mrs. Sherrer informed her husband that she did not intend to return to him. She secured
employment for herself, and on July 6, 1944, she filed a bill of
complaint for divorce in a Florida court. Among other things,
the bill alleged that Mrs. Sherrer was a bona fide resident of
Florida. Mr. Sherrer received notice by mail. He retained
Florida counsel who entered a general appearance and filed
an answer denying the allegations of Mrs. Sherrer's complaint.
Mr. Sherrer was present at the hearing and testified on the
issue of the custody of his children. However, no evidence
was introduced by him on the issue of Mrs. Sherrer's domicil
12.

201 U. S. 562 (1906).

13. 305 U. S. 32 (1938).
14.
15.
16.

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S.
378 (1948); Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (1948); Kreiger v.
Kreiger, 334 U. S. 555 (1948).
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in Florida. The decree of divorce was entered on November 29,
1944. Mrs. Sherrer married Henry A. Phelps two days later
and returned to Massachusetts on February 5, 1945.
Later in Massachusetts, Mr. Sherrer sought a judicial
declaration that while he was still married to Mrs. Sherrer he
might justifiably live apart from his wife, and that he might
be permitted to convey his real estate as though he were
single." The suit was predicated upon the asserted invalidity
of the Florida divorce decree in Massachusetts. The court
granted the relief sought. 8 Mrs. Sherrer had never acquired
a bona fide domicil in Florida, a question which the Massachusetts court considered itself free to re-examine. The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed the Massachusetts court.' 9
Because Mr. Sherrer had filed an appearance in Florida and
had participated in the Florida proceedings, Massachusetts
was not free to re-examine the question of domicil.
The majority opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson found
the divorce proceedings to have been conducted in accordance
with the highest procedural standards required by the Due
Process Clause. Mr. Sherrer had had the opportunity to
present evidence and to litigate all questions, including the
issue of domicil, upon which the jurisdiction of a state to
divorce is still said to depend. The divorce decree was subject
to no infirmities which under the Florida law would render it
subject to attack. Although the issue of domicil actually had
not been litigated, Massachusetts was bound, under the full
faith and credit clause, to give res judicata effect to the jurisdictional finding.
- • . the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional
grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been
participation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where
the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the
jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to
17.

18.
19.

The action was brought pursuant to a Massachusetts statute
which provides: "A probate court may upon petition of a husband
• . . enter a decree that said husband has been deserted by his
wife or that he is living apart from her for justifiable cause, and
he may thereafter convey his real estate in the same
and
with the same effect as if he were sole... " MASs. manner
GEN. LAWS
c. 209, § 36 (1932).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial
court, 320 Mass. 351, 69 N. E.2d 801 (1946).
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
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such collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered
the decree.20

Williams I was distinguished. There the defendant spouse
did not appear before the divorcing court and consequently
had no opportunity to contest the jurisdictional finding. Andrews v. Andrews was treated as having been drained of vitality by a line of cases, including Davis v. Davis, which had
applied the doctrine of res judicata to questions of personal
jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the subject matter.21 Failure
to litigate the jurisdictional issue is unimportant when a party
personally before the court has been afforded the opportunity
to do so.

22

The Chief Justice's opinion recognizes the importance of
a state's control over domestic relations. However, because
the present cases involved inconsistent assertions of power by
two states, the Supreme Court was required to apply the full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution and the Statute of
1790 in a mechanical fashion. The Constitution and Statute
give the Court no discretion to weigh policies or compare
state interests. If Massachusetts policies will be subverted as
a result of the Sherrer case, the subversion is merely "part of
the price of our Federal system." The very importance of the
interests involved in divorce proceedings require as much uniformity and certainty as possible.
In a vigorous dissent, 23 joined by Mr. Justice Murphy, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter reaffirmed his position taken in Williams
II. A divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit only if
the divorcing state was in truth the domicil of one of the
20.
21.

22.

23,

Id. at 351.
Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1941); Chicot County
Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940);
Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); Treinies v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66 (1939); Davis v. Davis, 305
U. S. 32 (1938); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938); American
Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932); Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
See also
Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and CollateralAttack: October
Term, 1939, 40 COL. L. REV. 1006 (1940); Gavit, Jurisdiction of
the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. OF PA. L. Ruv. 386

(1932).
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, and

Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 21, are two cases refusing
to limit res judicata only to those issues actually litigated. It
should be noted that neither is a case involving a conflict of laws
problem.
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 356 (1948).
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parties. The state of domicil has a special relationship to its
domiciliaries in respect to matters of domestic relations. By
an out-of-state law suit the parties may not foreclose re-examination of the question of domicil by the State of Massachusetts (thus undercutting important state policies) since Massachusetts was not a party to those proceedings. By permitting
Mr. Sherrer to raise the jurisdictional question Massachusetts
expressed its policy in regard to divorce as surely as if the
state had spoken by means of criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the view of the dissenting opinion, uniformity can be
attained by the Supreme Court only by permitting states with
lax laws to impose easy divorce policies on all the other states
and by giving the parties an open invitation to collusion and
perjury. The price is too 'high in view of the quantitatively
insignificant number of divorces involved. If reform is needed, the job is for Congress.
Without question, the Sherrer case is the product of a
policy designed to avoid the practical complications which
result from uncertainty as to marital status. 24 The intended
effect of the case and its companion, Coe v. Coe,25 is to clarify
the status of many divorces which have been granted in
24.

25.

See the remarks of Mr. Justice Jackson made during the course
of the oral argument in the present cases: "I am not worried
about the courts. At every bar meeting I've attended-and I
attend a good many-this thing comes up. Lawyers don't know
what in the world to advise their clients. Clients don't know how
to dispose of their property; or whether they are divorced or not
divorced. People-simple people-have to live by these rules.
If we can't do our job there's nobody insisting on our staying
here." 16 U. S. L. WEEK 3123 (Oct. 21, 1947).
334 U. S. 378 (1948).
Mr. and Mrs. Coe were domiciled in
Massachusetts until May, 1942.
In March, 1942, Mrs. Coe
secured a decree of separation from her husband in Massachusetts. Thereafter in May, 1942, Mr. Coe went to Reno accompanied by his secretary, Miss Dawn Allen, and her mother. After
Mr. Coe filed a suit for divorce, Mrs. Coe came to Nevada in
person and filed a cross-complaint for divorce and an answer
which admitted Mr. Coe's domicil in Nevada. Both Mr. and Mrs.
Coe personally testified in the Nevada hearing on questions relating to the merits of the divorce but neither of them raised any
objection as to the jurisdiction of the court. In September, 1942,
the Nevada court entered a decree of divorce in favor of Mrs.
Coe. Miss Dawn Allen and Mr. Coe were married shortly after
the decree was entered and returned to Massachusetts.
The
first Mrs. Coe filed a petition against Mr. Coe in May, 1943,
praying that he be adjudged in contempt of court for failing to
abide by the terms of the separation support decree. Mr. Coe
denied that the separation support decree was still in effect and
pleaded the Nevada divorce. Ultimately the Massachusetts courts
decided in favor of Mrs. Coe holding that the Nevada decree of
divorce was rendered without jurisdiction [316 Mass. 423, 55
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Nevada, Florida, or any other state in which liberal grounds
for divorce are combined with a short residence requirement.
In the recent emphasis which the Supreme Court has placed
upon the practical effects of its decisions in divorce cases
decided under the full faith and credit clause, the Court has
underscored an element which has not traditionally played a
large role in the theory which has grown up in regard to the
problem.
As a matter of orthodox theory, jurisdiction to divorce is
based on domicil, supposedly because of the peculiar interest
which a state has in the marital status of its domiciliaries.
Mr. Justice Douglas set forth this rationale in Williams I:
Each state as a sovereign, has a rightful and legitimate
concern in the marital status of the persons domiciled within
its borders. The marriage relation creates problems of large
social importance. Protection of offspring, property interests,
and the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few
of the commanding problems in the field of domestic relations
with which the state must deal. Thus it is plain that each
state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its
large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within
its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled
28
there, even though the other spouse is absent.

While, clearly, the chief verbal emphasis has been upon
the state's interest as a source of state power, 27 the peculiar
interest of the parties has been a factor which has not been
ignored in the divorce recognition cases decided under the full
faith and credit clause. When the leading cases are re-examined one may conclude that a regard for the interest of the
parties has been a principal consideration and a key to understanding Supreme Court decisions in this area.
In Cheever v. Wilson,2 8 one question raised was whether a
N. E.2d 702 (1944); 320 Mass. 295, 69 N. E.2d 793 (1946)]. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court "of the United States reversed the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on the strength of the
opinion in the Sherrer case.
26. 317 U. S. 287, 298 (1942).
27. In Williams II the power of F2 to inquire into the bona fides of
the plaintiff's domicil in F, also was said to exist for the protection of the interests of F2: "If a finding by the Court of one
State that domicil in another State has been abandoned were
conclusive upon the old domiciliary State, the policy of each state
in matters of most intimate concern could be subverted by the
policy of every other State. This Court has long ago denied the
existence of such destructive power." 325 U. S. at 231. See also
Andrews v. Andrews, supra note 10.
28. 9 Wall. 108 (U. S.1869).
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wife could have a different domicil from her husband so that
a divorce decree based upon the domicil of the wife only would
be entitled to recognition outside the divorcing state. In delivering the Court's opinion, Mr. Justice Swayne said:
It is insisted that Cheever never resided in Indiana; that

the domicil of the husband is the wife's, and that she cannot
have a different one from his. The converse of the latter
proposition is so well settled that it would be idle to discuss
it.

The rule is that she may acquire a separate domicil when-

ever it is necessary or proper that she should do so.

The

right springs from the necessity for its exercise, and endures
as long as the necessity continues. The proceedings for a

divorce may be instituted where the wife has her domicil.

The

place of marriage, of the offense, and the domicil of the
29

husband are of no consequence.

Some years later, in Atherton v. Atherton,30 the Supreme
Court decided that a divorce decree of Kentucky was entitled
to full faith and credit in New York, even though the plaintiffhusband alone was domiciled in Kentucky, and the defendantwife had not appeared personally before the Kentucky court.
Mr. Justice Gray felt that the wife's establishment of a separate domicil was not morally justifiable; therefore, the ex
parte decree of 'divorce must be given faith and credit. By
way of justifying its holding that the Kentucky courts had
jurisdiction to divorce in the full faith and credit sense, the
Court revealed its concern for the practical consequences to
the parties, saying, "To hold otherwise would make it difficult,
if not impossible, for the husband to obtain a divorce for the
cause alleged, if it actually existed." 3' 1
More recently the human problems which have engaged
the Court's attention have been those which arise because some
divorce decrees are not given the same effect in every state.
The problems became particularly acute after the Haddock
case and after migratory divorde had assumed the proportions
of big business in some states.3 2 Uncertainty as to status can
create as many unjust situations as can the inability of a
wronged party to obtain a divorce entitled to recognition
throughout the United States. According to Williams I, a
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 123-4 (italics supplied).
181 U. S. 155 (1901).
Id. at 173.
Bergeson, The Divorce Mill Advertises, 2 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. 348
(1935).
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state -which is the domicil of only one spouse has jurisdiction
to divorce, irrespective of the necessity or propriety of a
separate domicil. Here again the Supreme Court emphasized
the effect of a contrary holding on the personal interests of
the parties and their offspring. The parties might be considered married in one state but divorced in another. Furthermore, the children of any second marriage might well be legitimate in one state and illegitimate in another. Such considerations were of first importance in helping the Court arrive at
its decision:
Certainly if decrees of a state altering the marital status
of its domiciliaries are not valid throughout the Union even
though the requirements of procedural due process are wholly
met, a rule would be fostered which could not help but bring
"considerable disaster to innocent persons" and "bastardize
children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage" (Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Haddock v. Haddock
3
...), or else encourage collusive divorces.

The power of a state, recognized in Williams II, to inquire
into the jurisdiction of an ex parte decree can also be justified
by the proposition that the Supreme Court is moved in full
faith and credit divorce cases by a regard for fairness to the
parties involved. Williams II protects the non-resident defendant. While he must recognize his marriage as dissolved
if the plaintiff was domiciled in Fi, he is entitled to an opportunity to make sure that the plaintiff really' had become a
member of that community at the time the divorce was
granted.
Thus from the beginning, the power of a state over its
domiciliaries and the special interest of the state in its citizens
were not the only reasons which moved the Supreme Court in
divorce cases decided under the full faith and credit clause.
Fairness to a wronged spouse, who must live in a federal
system with its attendant diversity of divorce policies, was
also a principal consideration. Decisions in these cases were
reached with due regard for the interest of the persons concerned in the stability of their marital status, and the interest
of future children in the regularity of their pedigree.
Once more in the Sherrer and Coe cases the Supreme
Court was moved by the individual problems which face the
parties, particularly problems which arise because a decree of
33. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 301 (1942).
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divorce is not given uniform treatment throughout the United
States. The Court showed little concern with the interests of
the states as such or with questions of special power which a
home state might have. The interest of the parties to a marriage in certainty and in procedural fairness overshadowed the
abstract interest of the state of Massachusetts.
Had the Supreme Court wished to recognize the importance of the interest of Massachusetts a doctrine with respect
to the full faith and credit clause lay close at hand which
easily could have been applied in order to reach a contrary
result. Where F2 has a special interest and relationship to a
controversy, F 2 on a ground of public policy may disregard
the judicial proceedings of F 1 even if F did have personal
jurisdiction of the parties. This doctrine has appeared in a
few cases, 34 although in its terms the Statute of 1790 would
seem to require recognition in F2 of the judicial proceedings of
the sister-state regardless of any special interests which F,
might have in the subject matter. Whatever force it may still
have, the present cases make it quite clear that this limitation
of full faith and credit has no application in matters of
divorce.
If certainty achieved through uniform recognition of
divorce decrees is the means by which the Supreme Court is
to implement a policy which has regard for the interest of
individuals, the legal tools which the Court has fashioned will,
themselves, be limiting factors in the attainment of that end.
Williams II remains a major road block in the path of
certainty about marital status. As long as Williams II remains unmodified a collateral attack upon an ex parte decree
is possible in F. on jurisdictional grounds. Divorces which
are valid in one state but invalid in another are the inevitable
result.
34.

"It has often been recognized by this Court that there are some

limitations upon the extent to which a state will be required by the
full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another
state, in contravention of its own statutes, or policy."

Alaska

Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532, 546 (1935)
(italics supplied). This limitation on full faith and credit was
discussed in Williams I, 317 U. S. at 294. There Hood v. McGehee,

237 U. S. 611 (1915); Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386 (1910);
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1 (1909), are cited as examples of the limitation. The limitation is recognized in the Sherrer case: "This is not

to say that in no case may an area be recognized in which reasonable accommodations of interest may properly be made." 334 U. S.
at 355.
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The uncertainties which must result from Williams I are
intensified by the fact that the jurisdictional issue upon which
collateral attack is based in F2 is the issue of domicil. One's
domicil can be changed by physical presence within a state
plus an intention to remain there for an indefinite period.
What a person intends can only be known by the statements
and acts of the person involved and such statements and acts
can easily be self-serving. Triers of the same fact in two
states can draw contradictory but reasonable conclusions from
the evidence in the great majority of cases in which domicil is
the fact to be found. Of course, F2 cannot make its own finding de novo on the question of domicil. F1's decree is entitled
to "respect, and more."3 5 The burden of proving lack of domicil in F. must be placed upon the party attacking in F2. Nevertheless, state courts have found little difficulty in giving what
seems to be the required respect to the F. decree and still refusing recognition on jurisdictional grounds. 36
As long as "quickie" divorces are not in all circumstances
entitled to full faith and credit in every other state, and as
long as the slippery concept of domicil is the jurisdictional
basis for divorce under the full faith and credit clause, any
gain by way of added certainty in matters of marital status
must remain a relative one.
A greater degree of certainty would be possible if the
Court would abandon domicil as the basis for divorce recognition under the full faith and credit clause. Residence for a
definite period of time (for example, one year) has been
suggested as the substitute for domicil.3

7

The substitution

of a fixed period of residence for domicil could be accomplished either by a congressional statute38 or by a Supreme
Court decision redefining the jurisdictional basis which will
entitle divorce decrees to full faith and credit. Should the
Congress or the Supreme Court accept the suggested substitu35.
36.
37.

Frankfurter, J., in Williams II, 325 U. S. at 233.
Cases cited note 52 infra.
Rutledge, J., dissenting in William I, 325 U. S. 226, 244 et seq.,
and especially 260, n.16, suggests that one year of residence as the

jurisdictional requirement for divorce could be adopted by the Supreme Court, apparently without legislation by Congress.

See also

1 RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 460-1

(1945).

Lorenzen, ExtraterritorialDivorce-William v. North

CarolinaII, 54 YAME L. J.799, 805 (1945).

38. Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. OF PA. L. REv.
371, 388 (1933).
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tion, presumably some states would continue to grant divorces
on the basis of 42 or 90 days residence. Parties obtaining
their decrees in such states would be validly divorced there
as well as in any other state which would recognize the
decree by virtue of the conflict of laws.39 Nevertheless, it
would be quite clear that recognition in other states would
not be required by force of the Statute of 1790 and the Constitution.
In any event the certainty which is attained by requiring uniform recognition or non-recognition of divorce decrees
can be only moderately successful in avoiding harsh solutions
to human problems. Even were it made clear that the 42 or
90 day divorces of Nevada and Florida are entitled neither
to full faith and credit nor recognition as a matter of local
conflict of laws, some uncertainty is inevitable as long as
those states actually grant the decrees on the basis of a
short period of residence. The very fact that parties will
obtain divorce decrees and, believing them to be valid, will
begin to act under them in other states will create practical
problems of property, legitimacy and status. In the course
of time these problems cannot be happily solved if the decree
is declared to have been invalid from the beginning.40 They
can be avoided only if no decrees are granted save those
entitled to recognition outside the divorcing state.
Even in cases where the parties to a marriage have been
granted a divorce by a court having personal jurisdiction
over them questions arise which are not disposed of by the
Sherrer and Coe cases. In an article which purports to advise
the alumnae of a prominent eastern school for women the
author, in speaking of divorce, suggests that a binding decree
is easily obtained by those who can afford to go to Reno or
Miami and who can persuade their husbands merely to file
an appearance by counsel. 41 Whether this is sound advice is
39.

See discussion, pp. 43 to 46 infra.

40.

Harper, The Myth of Void Divorce, 2 LAw & CONTEim.P. PRoB. 335

41.

(1935).
"For those who can raise the ready cash, of course, no such procedure is necessary if they decide the marriage should be terminated.
All they have to do is to agree which one of them is to have a
pleasant sojourn in Nevada or Florida or one of the other 'easy
divorce' states. Provided only that one party is there present for
the requisite 6 weeks or 3 months and the other is represented by
counsel there, a valid divorce will issue-which despite some waverings in the authorities, will probably be entitled to 'full faith and
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not definitely clear from the Sherrer and Coe cases. In both
cases, the attacking party was actually present in F, and
litigated at least some issues with respect to the divorce, if
not the issue of domicil. In the Sherrer opinion, Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson is careful to point out the extent of the non42
resident defendant's activity in the Florida proceeding.
He notes several times that the defendant had "participated"
in the suit. Whether participation includes the mere filing
of an appearance must be regarded as an open question.
Yet it is a question which will admit of only one workable solution. If spouses who are within the personal jurisdiction of F. are bound because of the opportunity which
F3 has given them to litigate the issue of domicil, that opportunity is afforded by an appearance by counsel as well as
by the spouse's personal presence within a state. If the
defendant-spouse is bound only by proceedings in which he
has participated to a greater degree than the mere filing
of an appearance by counsel, the Supreme Court is left
with the difficult job of defining "participation."
This
process of definition can only introduce new uncertainties.
How much participation must there be? Must some issues
be contested? How long must the defendant be present in
the divorcing state?
As the advice referred to above implies, the effect of
the Sherrer and Coe cases is to permit the parties by mutual
consent to confer jurisdiction of the subject matter upon a
forum. Of course domicil must be an issue which the divorcing state has determined expressly or by implication if the
parties are to be bound on a theory of res judicata. However, throughout the United States courts in granting a divorce do hold or assume one of the spouses to be a domiciliary
of the state of divorce because domicil is universally the
jurisdictional requirement set forth in state statutes. 43 Further, full opportunity to litigate that issue must have been
afforded. Mexican divorces in which both parties have
participated are still subject to collateral attack not only
credit' throughout the 48 states." Pilpel, The Sex Side of the Law,

(June, 1948).
334 U. S. 343, 352 (1948).
While most divorce statutes use the term "residence" in stating the
jurisdictional requirement, "residence" has been interpreted to mean
"domicil."
RESTATEMENT, CONFLCT OF LAWS § 9, comment e
(1934).
33 VASSAR ALUMiNAE MAGAzINE 3, 4

42.
43.
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because the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable
in the case of a decree granted by a foreign country
but also because those divorces are not, even in theory,
granted on the basis of domicil. 4"
The Sherrer and Coe cases rest squarely upon a doctrine
of res judicata: Having had the opportunity to litigate the
question of his wife's domicil, and having been personally
before the Florida court which made a finding on the question of domicil, Mr. Sherrer will not now be heard to deny
that Mrs. Sherrer's domicil was in fact in the divorcing state.
The cases do not answer the question whether other interested persons who did not have the opportunity to challenge
the jurisdiction of the divorcing court are bound in some
manner by the finding on the jurisdictional issue. Two recent
cases decided in the lower courts of the State of New York
will illustrate the problem. In deMarigny v. deMarigny,41
Nancy Oakes deMarigny sought an annulment of her marriage on the ground that her husband had not been properly
divorced from his first wife. Allegedly, the divorce decree
was a nullity because neither her husband nor his former
wife had been actually domiciled in Florida. Alfred deMarigny
took the position that because both he and his first wife had
made a personal appearance before the Florida court the
decree was immune from attack. Since the present Mrs.
deMarigny had not been a party to the Florida litigation,
the New York trial court permitted her to attack the validity
of her husband's divorce. She was not bound by the Florida
decree. On the other hand, in Bane v. Bane,4" another judge
of the New York Supreme Court refused, in an annulment
action based upon a similar contention, to permit a present
wife to question the jurisdictional basis of her husband's
previous divorce. A divorce action was said to be an in rem
proceeding. The decree is binding upon the whole world
when a court has decided that the res is within its jurisdiction and full opportunity to litigate all issues has been
44.

In Caldwell v. Caldwell, 81 N. E.2d 60 (N. Y. 1948), the Court of
Appeals of New York recently allowed a participating party to
attack the validity of a Mexican divorce. Other New York cases
which had prevented a participating party from attacking a divorce
granted by a sister state were distinguished. "Here the defendant

.. never alleged or claimed domicil in Mexico."
45. 81 N. Y. S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
46. 80 N. Y. S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1948).

Id. at 63.
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afforded. Both judges cite and discuss the Coe and Sherrer
cases although contradictory results are reached.
As a practical matter, to permit an action for annulment here would in some circumstances place it within the
power of the second spouse of a divorced person to terminate
a second marriage whenever it serves his interest to do so.
However, given the rationale of the Court in the Sherrer
and Coe cases, the opinion of the trial judge in deMarigny
seems to be correct. As a matter of legal logic the Bane case
is unsound. The conclusiveness of an in rem proceeding
would depend upon whether the res, the basis for jurisdiction,
was present within the state purporting to act upon it. It
is difficult to see how interested parties could be foreclosed
on that jurisdictional issue by the opportunity to raise the
question which someone else has been given.
Nor would a theory of estoppel or res judicata bind a
state which itself chose to question the validity of a divorce.
While Fa may not protect its interest by allowing a participant in a foreign proceeding to attack the foreign decree
collaterally, F2 will not be bound by the jurisdictional finding
of F1 when F2 itself becomes a party to litigation involving
those who were divorced outside its jurisdiction. For
example, perhaps Massachusetts could jail either of the participants to the Florida proceedings should they take other
spouses. 47 Obviously, if this is possible under the Sherrer
case the harshest results would follow. Hence, if H participated as a defendant in a Nevada divorce proceeding but did
not litigate the question of W's domicil, upon return to
Massachusetts, H, having married C, might be jailed as abigamist. Yet H could not obtain a judicial determination
from the courts of Massachusetts to the effect that W was
still his lawful wife. If these unfortunate practical consequences of the doctrines applied in Sherrer and Coe are to be
avoided, the ordinary limitations of the res judicata principle
itself must be ignored when the divorce decree is attacked
by strangers to the divorce proceeding.
Legal logic can carry us only so far in the work of the
47.

Mr. Justice Jackson has entertained this possibility. "Davis v.
Davis.... in no way indicates that a finding of domicile after appearance of the absent spouse and litigation of the question would
be conclusive upon the state of his domicile in litigation involving
its interests and not merely those of the parties." Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 320, n.7 (1942).
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law. At some point the practical problems which the doctrines have made will reshape the doctrines according to the
necessities of the matter. In the Shdrrer case Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson has used language which may foreshadow
the result which the Court will reach when a stranger seeks
to attack a decree which the parties may not challenge.
It is quite another thing to hold that the vital rights and interests involved in divorce litigation may be held in suspense pending the scrutiny by courts of sister States of findings of jurisdictional fact made by a competent court in proceedings conducted in a manner consistent with the highest requirements
of due process and in which the defendant has participated.
We do not conceive it to be in accord with the purposes of the
full faith and credit requirement to hold that a judgment
rendered under the circumstances of this case may be required
to run the gantlet of such collateral attack in the courts of
sister States before its validity outside
of the State which
4
rendered it is established or rejected. 8

This language is uncompromising in setting forth the duties
of faith and credit which lie upon the states. The Chief
Justice's remarks are not limited to cases in which a participating spouse is the litigant attacking the decree. If
this dictum is a fair indication, the Court may resolve the
problem when it is presented simply by laying down the flat
proposition: Something less than full faith and credit has
been given if a state has permitted a stranger to question
the jurisdictional basis of a decree when, following the
Sherrer case, the parties to the original proceeding could not
do so. This position may not satisfy one's feeling for nicety
in legal doctrine; indeed, it may be little more than a statement of the conclusion, but it Would operate to solve some of
the problems which the Supreme Court has created for itself.4 9
48.
49.

334 U. S. at 356.
The state courts have used various means of preventing attacks by
strangers to the original decree. Before tlia decisions in the Sherrer
and Coe cases, the courts of New York had refused, as a matter of
New York law, to allow appearing spouses to attack decrees of
divorce in the procurement of which they had participated. In Shea
v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 60 N. Y. S.2d 823 (2d Dep't 1946), the
Appellate Division dealt with the question of whether a stranger to
the foreign divorce could attack it on jurisdictional grounds in an
action against a spouse who was estopped by appearance and participation. The attack was not permitted. The court placed its
decision upon a New York public policy which would forbid the
collateral attack of a third person when the parties to the original
proceeding might not do so. In recognizing this policy the New
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The net result of the Sherrer and Coe cases may be a real
gain in the matter of certainty and uniformity of recognition
throughout the United States. Yet mandatory recognition
of a divorce granted by one of the typical divorce-mill states,
such as Nevada and Florida, will purchase the gain at a
price. Any decision which requires the giving of full faith
and credit to a divorce granted in a state which combines a
liberal substantive law of divorce with brief residence requirements makes it very difficult for other states to maintain strict divorce policies. Sherrer and Coe make it possible
for domiciliaries to take up residence in a liberal jurisdiction
for a brief period and then to return home-having been
divorced in the meantime. Those who can afford to take
the journey can undercut any policy which is more strict
than that of the most liberal state.
Cases like Sherrer v. Sherrer and Coe v. Coe are bound
to encourage collusion and fraud.50 One fact should be
squarely faced: The great majority of divorces granted in
Nevada and Florida, to parties who have resided in those
states for the minimum time required, are the product of
perjury, pure and simple. It should be remembered that
even in these jurisdictions the plaintiff must allege that he
is domiciled in the state. He must allege physical presence
plus the intention to remain in the jurisdiction indefinitely.
He must allege that Nevada or Florida is his home; his
"technically preEminent headquarters."'51 Of course, the
overwhelming majority of persons who come to Nevada and
Florida and are divorced after the minimum residence period
in those states are not bona fide domiciliaries. The typical
fact situation is that in which a litigant leaves the state
where the divorce laws are tough; stays in Nevada or Florida
for the minimum period required by statute; obtains a di-

50.

51.

York court was undoubtedly influenced by the unhappy situations
which would result from a decision to the contrary. 3id. at 827.
The Montana Supreme Court did not allow strangers to attack
a Nevada decree, in part, on the ground that they were in privity
with a person who was estopped. In re Anderson's Estate, 194 P.2d
621 (Mont. 1948).
One of my more easily satisfied colleagues has passed the following
judgment on the Sherrer and Coe cases: "Among the most satisfying accomplishments of the Court at the 1947 term is clarification
of the divorce muddle." Frank, The United States Supreme Court:
1947-48, 16 U. oF Cnr. L. REv. 1, 43 (1948).
Holmes, J., so defines domicil in Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S.
619, 625 (1913).
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vorce; and immediately departs for the state of his origin.52
No domicil is acquired in the ordinary sense. The Sherrer
and Coe cases apparently make collusion foolproof. Whether
the resultant clarity as to the status of a person's marriage
is worth the price in fraud, collusion, and false allegations
may well be doubted.
This is not to say, as some have,5

3

that any position in

regard to the migratory divorce cases depends upon an attitude toward the ease or difficulty of obtaining a divorce.
Rather one's position depends upon his feeling about the
integrity of the legal process. Whether divorces are easy or
difficult to obtain, the writer cannot agree that litigants
should be encouraged to falsify their pleadings and to connive with others in avoiding the laws of the place where they
really make their home.
Lawyers will learn quickly how to advise clients who
wish to arrange an effective divorce. But there remains the
problem of what advice can be given a client who wants to
fight. If a spouse appears in a divorce action what action
can he take to contest the jurisdiction of the court? Clearly,
he may seek to persuade the trial court that his spouse is
not domiciled in the divorcing state and he may introduce
evidence in support of his contention. If he fails; a measure
of appellate review is possible within the state court system."
In the appellate court the issue will probably be: Is the trial
court's finding on the question of domicil supported by such
evidence that a reasonable man could arrive at the trial
court's conclusion?
Can the decision of the state supreme court on this
question be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United
52.

Fact situations of this sort have appeared in many reported cases
throughout the United States: Wilkes v. Wilkes, 245 Ala. 54, 16
So.2d 15 (1943); Crouch v. Crouch, 28 Cal.2d 243, 169 P.2d 897
(1946); Koscove v. Koscove, 113 Colo. 317, 156 P.2d 696 (1945);
Ainscow v. Alexander, 39 A.2d 54 (Del. 1944); Atkins v. Atkins,
393 Ill. 202, 65 N. E.2d 801 (1946); Coe v. Coe, 316 Mass. 423, 55
N. E.2d 702 (1944); Gray v. Gray, 320 Mich. 49, 30 N. W.2d 426
(1948); Wolff v. Wolff, 134 N. J.Eq. 8, 34 A.2d 150 (Ch. 1943);
Kurski v. Kurski, 185 Misc. 97, 55 N. Y. S.2d 748 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.
Y. City 1945); Slapp v. Slapp, 143 Ohio St. 105, 54 N. E.2d 153
(1944); Esenwein v. Esenwein, 348 Pa. 455, 35 A.2d 335 (1944).
53. Lorenzen, ExtraterritorialDivorce-Williams v. North Carolina II,
54 YALE L. J. 799, 800 (1945).
54. We are assured by the majority opinion in Sherrer v. Sherrer:
"Appeals lie to the Florida Supreme Court from final decrees of
divorce. Fla. Const. Art. V, 9 5." 334 U. S. at 346, n.7.
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States? There would seem to be only two possibilities for
considering the state court finding as to domicil a federal
question in the state court: (1) To grant a divorce to persons not really domiciled in the State may be a denial of due
process of law; (2) To apply the substantive divorce law
of the forum in granting a divorce to non-domiciliaries may
be a denial of full faith and credit to the public acts of a sister
state.
Jurisdiction to divorce is still supposedly based on the
domicil of at least one spouse. In the case of an in personam
judgment, the entry of the judgment without proper jurisdiction is a denial of due process. 55 Perhaps in a like manner,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been violated when a state grants a divorce in a case where
neither party is really a domiciliary of the state. The Supreme Court has never passed directly upon the question.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion for the Court
in Williams II, did not have this quesion before him. He did
state, however:
In seeking a decree of divorce outside the State in which
he has theretofore maintained his marriage, a person is
necessarily involved in the legal situation created by our federal
system, whereby one State can grant a divorce of validity in
other States only if the applicant has a bona fide domicil in
the State of the court purporting to dissolve a prior legal marriage.56

It should be noted here that the Justice does not say that the
divorces are void everywhere (as would be the case had due
process been violated) unless there is a bona fide domicil in
the state purporting to dissolve the marriage. He says
merely that a divorce without domicil is not entitled to extrastate effect. However, other language in Williams II is more
revealing upon this point. Mr. Justice Murphy tells us:
The State of Nevada has unquestioned authority, consistent
with procedural due process, to grant divorces on whatever
basis it sees fit to all who meet its statutory requirements.
It is entitled, moreover, to give to its divorce decrees absolute
and binding finality within the confines of its borders.
But if Nevada's divorce decrees are to be accorded full
faith and credit in the courts of her sister states it is essential
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; RESTATSaxENT, CoNFLICT op
LAWS § 74 (1934).
56. 325 U. S. 226, 238 (1945) (italics supplied).
55.
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that Nevada have proper jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings. This means that at least one of the parties to each ex
parte proceeding must have a bona fide domicil within Nevada
5
for whatever length of time Nevada may prescribe. 7

According to Mr. Justice Murphy then (and presumably
he spoke, as well, for Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice
Jackson, who concurred with him) a state is perfectly free
to dissolve a marriage on any 'statutory jurisdictional basis.
The ensuing decree may not be entitled to full faith and
8
credit but yet the due process clause has not been violated.
If these dicta are correctly interpreted and if they indicate
how the Court would decide the question today, the fact that
Florida or Nevada enters a divorce decree without the proper
jurisdictional basis is not of itself a federal question. Apparently, the appearing spouse has no due process question
in Florida.
With few exceptions a state which grants a divorce
applies its own substantive rules of divorce without regard
to the law of the place where the grounds for divorce occurred or the law of the domicil of the parties at the time
of those acts.59 Perhaps the application of Florida divorce
law to persons not actually domiciled in Florida is a denial
of full faith and credit to the "public Acts" of the state in
which the parties have their true domicil. The Supreme
Court has not been faced with this contention in divorce
cases. However, as a general matter in determining the
faith and credit to be given the statutes of sister states the
Court in a few cases has purported to be "appraising the
governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the
scale of decision according to their weight."' ° Thus conceiv57.
58.

Id. at 239.
It is further made clear that Mr. Justice Black, dissenting for himself and Mr. Justice Douglas in Williams II, takes the same view.
In interpreting the opinion of the court in Williams II (an interpretation not necessarily correct) Mr. Justice Black says, "The Court
today, however, seems to place its holding that the Nevada decrees
are void on the basis that the Due Process Clause makes domicil an
indispensable prerequisite to a state court's 'jurisdiction' to grant
divorce.... I cannot agree to this latest expansion of federal power
and the consequent diminution of state power over marriage and
marriage dissolution which the Court derives from adding a new
content to the Due Process Clause." Id. at 271.
59. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT or LAWs § 135 (1934).
60. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532, 547
(1935). See also Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
306 U. S.493 (1939).

1948]

MIGRATORY DIVORCE: CHAPTERS III AND IV

45

ably, the faith and credit to be given the statutes of sister
states in divorce matters could be made to turn upon whether
one party was truly domiciled in the divorcing state. The
interests of the state of bona fide domicil would seem to be
considerably greater than those of the state wherein one
party to a marriage has been residing for a few weeks. If
the Supreme Court would agree, the appearing spouse would
have a way of obtaining federal review of the state court's
finding on domicil. However, in view of the dicta referred
to above it seems highly unlikely that the Court would be
willing to supervise the jurisdictional bases for granting
divorces in the states. The use of the full faith and credit
clause for this purpose would be no more attractive than due
process.
Unless the Supreme Court of the United States is willing to make the jurisdictional basis of divorce a question
either of due process or full faith and credit, the litigant
who appears in the divorcing state is bound by the state
court finding on the domicil issue.61 If he really wants to
challenge the divorce, he would do well to stay out of a state
in which tflose who apply the law are easily convinced that
a new domicil has been obtained.2 The vague character of
the rules on domicil and the limited review which will be
given on issues of "fact" make the law-in-action of first im61.

A question may be raised whether the res judicata doctrine was
correctly applied in the Sherrer and Coe cases. The doctrine is
properly applicable to bind Mr. Sherrer in Massachusetts by the
Florida finding as to domicil, only if the issue is the same in
Massachusetts as it was in Florida. However, "domicil" may not
be identical with "domicil". The definition of a legal concept will
depend upon the purpose which it is called to serve. It must be
clear that in Massachusetts the question of domicil is a federal
matter. The circumstances under which a divorce decree is entitled
to full faith and credit (the jurisdiction to divorce under the full
faith and credit clause) is certainly a federal question which ought
to be reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr.
Sherrer could, indeed, have litigated a question labeled "domicil,"
but was it "domicil" within the meaning of the Florida divorce
statutes or was it "domicil," a jurisdictional issue under the Constitution of the United States?
If there is neither a due process nor a full faith and credit
question in Florida, then Mr. Sherrer finds himself bound by failing
to litigate a federal question in Florida (the jurisdictional basis of a
divorce decree which is entitled to full faith and credit) which was
not before the Florida court.
62. In some places the rules on the subject of domicil cannot be honestly
applied because of the commercial pressures from the business community. See Ingrain and Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 302 (1935).
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portance to counsel. The spouse who wants to challenge a
Florida or Nevada decree will probably be well advised to
litigate the domicil question by way of a collateral attack
in the normally friendly courts of his home state.63
CHAPTER IV:

THE GHOST OF HADDOCK

It would be easy to make the assumption that while a
person may be considered married in one state and not in
another, at least he would either be definitely married or
single within the borders of a single state. However, the
result in Estin v. Estin64 and Kreiger v. Kreiger65 can be

stated in such a way that the contrary is true. A person
who has obtained a divorce decree must ask the question:
"For what purpose am I divorced?" The Supreme Court,
by its own admission, has adopted the doctrine of "divisible
divorce."66
Mr. Estin and his wife lived together in New York
until 1942. In 1943, Mrs. Estin was granted a decree of
separation and $180 per month as permanent alimony in a
proceeding in which Mr. Estin had entered a general appearance. In January, 1944, Mr. Estin went to Nevada and

in May, 1945, a Nevada court, having found that Mr. Estin
63.

One further proposition should be remembered when the client who
wants to fight is given counsel. A decree is only entitled to such
credit in F, as it would be given in F. If the decree is subject to
attack on a ground such as fraud in the state which grants it, the
divorce can be attacked on that ground in any other state without
violating the full faith and credit clause. The Statute of 1790 only
requires judicial proceedings to be given such faith and credit "as
they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which
they are taken." See Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 482, 55 S. E.
371 (1906).
64. 334 U. S. 541 (1948).
65. 334 U. S. 555 (1948). The Kreiger case, a companion to Estin v.
Estin, involved a New York support order against the husband and
a subsequent ex parte Nevada divorce obtained by him. After the
Nevada decree was granted, Mr. Kreiger ceased payment of the
support money under the New York decree. Mrs. Krieger sought a
judgment for back alimony in the New York courts. Her husband
appeared and unsuccessfully pleaded the Nevada divorce as a defense. The trial court was affirmed by the New York Court of
Appeals. 297 N. Y. 530, 74 N. E.2d 468 (1947). On certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the New York court. While the Nevada
divorce was pending, Mrs. Kreiger obtained a New York injunction
purporting to restrain her husband from seeking the divorce. Whether the Nevada court denied full faith and credit to this injunction
in granting a divorce with knowledge of it is a question reserved by
the Court for a later episode.
66. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 549 (1948).

1948]

MiGRATORY DIVORCE: CHAPTERS III AND IV

47

had been a bona fide resident of Nevada since January,
1944, granted him an ex parte divorce.67
After the entry of the Nevada divorce decree Mr. Estin
ceased paying installments falling due under the terms of
the New York separation decree. Mrs. Estin brought an
action in the New York courts asking for accrued alimony.
Her husband appeared and, contending that his duty to
support her was terminated by the Nevada divorce, moved
to strike out the alimony provisions of the separation decree.
This motion was denied by the courts of the State of New
York even though Mr. Estin was admitted to be a bona fide
domiciliary of Nevada.68 On certiorari, the New York courts
were affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion distinguishes between different aspects of the marriage relationship. However exacting the requirements of full faith and credit may
be they do not require that the state of the domicil of one
spouse may enter a decree that changes every legal incident
of marriage. The state of either party's domicil may grant
a divorce entitled to full faith and credit as to questions of
marital status and legitimacy. Yet on the matter of support
the state in which the abandoned spouse is domiciled has an
important interest which that state may protect.69
Nevada divorces may well put an end to a Nevada support order. However, the New York alimony decree was
granted by a court having personal jurisdiction over the
parties. The alimony decree is a property interest of Mrs.
Estin which cannot be taken from her by a court which
does not have jurisdiction over her person. Nevada is without power to terminate Mrs. Estin's rights in the New York
decree.
In a dissent Mr. Justice Frankfurter perceives the crucial issue to be whether New York "has held that no "ex parte"
67.

68.
69.

The divorce court in Nevada knew of the New York support order
yet made no provision for alimony. The court reserved the question
whether Nevada had thus denied full faith and credit to the New
York support order. Ibid.
Estin v. Estin, 63 N.Y. S.2d 476 (1946), aff'd 271 App. Div. 829,66
N. Y. S.2d 421 (1946), aff'd, 296 N. Y. 308, 73 N. E.2d 113 (1947).
In the Estin case Mr. Justice Douglas only has occasion to distinguish between support and status as separable incidents of marriage.
Presumably other aspects of marriage (e.g., marital property rights,
inheritance) could also be distinguished for jurisdictional purposes.
However, this paper does not purport to treat more than the distinction between support and status.
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divorce decree could terminate a prior New York separate
maintenance decree, or whether it has decided merely that
no "ex parte" divorce decree of another State could." 0 The
majority of the Court incorrectly assumed that the Court
of Appeals clearly stated the New York rule on this question. Mr. Justice Frankfurter would remand the case to
the New York courts for clarification of its rationale."'
The problem of whether a foreign ex parte divorce
decree will terminate an existing order for support and
maintenance first poses a question to be solved by the conflict of laws of the state in which the support order is
challenged.
Some courts have permitted a foreign ex parte divorce
decree to terminate a support order entered against a husband.72 Others have taken the position that because alimony
is a personal right which can be granted only after personal
service upon a husband, the wife's right to support under
an alimony decree is also an in personam right which cannot
be terminated by an ex parte divorce. 73 This view creates
a full faith and credit problem in states which embrace it
only if the divorcing state would consider a support order
terminated by its own ex parte divorce. Judicial proceedings are entitled to no greater effect in New York than in
Nevada. The present cases arise under the full faith and
70.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter believes that New York would deny full

faith and credit to a Nevada ex parte divorce if the foreign decree
should be given an effect in New York different from the effect
given there to a New York ex parte divorce. Id. at 549. In this view
the faith and credit which must be given would depend upon the
effect in New York of a New York ex parte decree-a proposition

of the New York internal law. The Statute of 1790 defines the recognition required of foreign judicial proceedings as that which
".they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which
they are taken." (Italics supplied.) For some purposes the Court
has permitted a state to treat a foreign judgment less favorably
than its own. See M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1839).
Cf. Hood v. McGehee, 237 U. S.611 (1915).

71.

Mr. Justice Jackson in a separate dissent assumes that under the
New York law a New York divorce would have terminated a wife's
right to support. In accordance with Mr. Justice Frankfurter he
believes full faith and credit requires a Nevada decree to be given
similar effect. 334 U. S.541, 553 (1948). Mr. Justice Jackson's

estimate of the New York law is not without substance, 53 DIcx. L.
REV. 72 (1948).
Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Cal.2d 762, 68 P.2d 351 (1937) ; Durlacher
v. Durlacher, 35 F.Supp. 1005 (D. Nev. 1940); McCullough v. McCullough, 203 Mich. 288, 168 N. W. 929 (1918) semble.
73. E. g., Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262 (1925) ; Simonton v. Simonton, 40 Idaho 751, 236 Pac. 863 (1925).

72.
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credit clause because, although in Nevada a divorce decree
would terminate a support order74 the New York courts
nevertheless refuse to give the divorce such effect in New
York.
The Estin case makes it clear that F2 may adopt either
conflict of laws rule it chooses. If F2 wishes to treat the ex
parte foreign divorce as ending a support decree, it may do
so. But F2 may also, if it wishes, ignore the F1 decree so
far as the termination of a support order is concerned. F.
does not possess the power to extinguish a wife's right under
a support order of F2 by force of F.'s ex parte divorce decree.
By making a separation between matters of support and
other incidents of marriage the Supreme Court has limited
the extent to which a state with easy divorce policies may
thwart the family law policies of a sister state. At least in
cases where a husband's duty to support has been defined
by the support order of one state he may not be relieved
of that duty by another state unless the wife is personally
within its jurisdiction75
In the case of many family serials a character long
thought to be dead reappears to take his place in the ever
unfolding plot. So also in the lawyers' edition of the 'daytime serial, we may witness the revival of an old friend.
It is clear that he was dead. The very Justice who brings
news of resurrection told us: "Haddock v. Haddock is overruled."76
In Haddock v. Haddock7 7 the wife, a resident of the State
of New York, sued her husband in New York for a limited
divorce and a decree of alimony. According to the complaint
the parties had been married in New York wherein they were
both domiciled. The husband had abandoned the wife immediately after the marriage. It appeared that the husband
had obtained a decree of divorce in his new domicil, Connecticut, some years before the wife's suit was commenced. Mr.
74.

Mr. Justice Douglas, citing Herrick v. Herrick, 55 Nev. 59, 68, 25

P.2d 378, 380 (1933), assumes this to be true. The citation is to a
rather unsatisfactory dictum.
75. Where both parties of a marriage are personally before the divorcing court and a decree is entered which purports to be a final adjudication of a wife's right to alimony, the resulting decree is a bar
to further provisions for support. Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520

(1918) ;,cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933).
76. Mr. Justice Douglas in Williams I, 317 U. S. 287, 304 (1942).
77. 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
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Haddock contended that the Connecticut decree terminated
his liability for support by virtue of the full faith and credit
clause. The New York court chose to ignore the Connecticut
decree and granted the relief sought by the wife. On certiorari a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground that the Connecticut decree was not entitled to full
faith and credit.
Of course, the majority opinion in the Haddock case
treated the Connecticut decree, an ex parte decree entered
in a state other than the "matrimonial domicil," as not entitled to full faith and credit for any purpose. Williams I
corrects Haddock on that score. Yet the result in the Haddock case on its facts would be duplicated today if the distinction between support and capacity made in the Estin
case is extended to situations in which a support decree is
entered subsequent to a valid foreign divorce.78
Whether a foreign ex parte decree will operate to bar
a suit for alimony after the decree is granted again raises
a conflict of laws question to be solved by the law of the
forum. 79

American jurisdictions have answered the question

in many different ways. In some states alimony cannot be
granted at all after a divorce even though the decree was ex
parte and was granted in a foreign state. Various reasons
78.

79.

Some thirty years after Haddock v. Haddock, Professor Joseph W.
Bingham contended that the Haddock case did not leave Connecticut
completely powerless to deal with Mr. Haddock's marriage. Professor Bingham distinguished between the various incidents of marriage and came to the conclusion: ". .. the husband's marital capacity was restored not only under Connecticut law, but under New
York law .... On the other hand, his marital duty to support his
New York spouse, as though still his wife insofar as New York law
was concerned was not dissolved because Connecticut under the
circumstances of the case had not the legal power to decree dissolution in this particular." The American Law Institute v. The
Supreme Court, 21 CORN. L. Q. 393, 421 (1936). After Williams I
a few commentators, notably Walter Wheeler Cook writing in the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, doubted whether the Haddock case was
really overruled. Their caution was based upon the Bingham analysis. See Barnhard, Haddock Reversed-Harbinger of Divisible
Divorce, 31 GEo. L. J. 210 (1943); Radin, The Authenticated Full
Faithand Credit Clause, 39 ILL. L. RFy. 1 (1944) ; Cook, Is Haddock
v. Haddock Overruled?,18 IND. L. J. 165 (1943) ; Holt, The Bones of
Haddock v. Haddock, 41 MIcH. L. REV. 1013 (1943). The point is
also made in an excellent discussion written after Williams 11:
Powell, And Repent At Leisure, 58 HARv. L. REv. 930, 953 (1945).
Notes, Alimony after Foreign Decrees of Divorce, 53 HARv. L. REV.
1180 (1940); Award of Alimony Subsequent to a Decree of Divorce,
34 Ky. L. J. 149 (1946). The cases are collected in Note, 42 A. L. R.
1385 (1926).
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are given: Alimony depends upon the marriage relationship
which is destroyed by a valid divorce;8° courts have jurisdiction to grant a decree for alimony only as an incident to
a divorce proceeding and where the parties are already divorced no second action is possible ;", or the divorce judgment
is res judicata on the question of alimony.8 2 However, in
many states alimony may be obtained even after a decree
of divorce. 3 In those states an action for alimony is allowed
apart from divorce proceedings. In them a wife may not
be deprived of her right to alimony by a court which lacks
personal jurisdiction over her.
If any divorce will bar alimony in a forum no full faith
and credit problem will arise there. A state may give a
divorce decree greater recognition than the Constitution
requires. Again, no full faith and credit problem is presented if the state which grants the divorce also permits
a suit for alimony after the decree. A full faith and credit
problem similar to that of the Estin and Haddock cases
arises only where Fa permits a suit for support after a
divorce decree has been entered in F, and where F, is a state
in which no alimony may be given after the entry of the divorce decree.
There are many practical reasons which might prompt
a state to recognize a wife's right to support (thus raising
a full faith and credit question in some instances) although
the marriage has been dissolved for other purposes. A
regard for her husband's interest and the interest of his children may require a deserted wife to suffer her husband's
desertion, his divorce in another state, and his subsequent
marriage without requiring her to relinquish financial support as well. Without financial assistance from her former
husband a wife may easily be reduced to poverty or to the indignity of becoming a public charge. Furthermore, the
actual suit for divorce may be granted on service of the wife
E.g., Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal. App.2d 233, 160 P.2d 923 (1945) ;
Patterson v. Patterson, 187 P.2d 113 (Cal. App. 1947); McCoy v.
McCoy, 191 Iowa 973, 183 N. W. 377 (1921).
81. Bowman v. Worthington, 24 Ark. 522 (1866); but see Wood v.
Wood, 54 Ark. 172, 15 S. W. 459 (1891) (modifying Bowman v.
Worthington).
82. E.g., McCormick v. McCormick, 82 Ran. 31, 107 Pac. 546 (1910);
Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Neb. 613, 87 N. W. 340 (1901).
83. E.g., Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241 (1921); Searles v.
Searles, 140 Minn. 382, 168 N. W. 133 (1918).
80.
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by publication. With such service, the wife may have no
actual knowledge of the pendency of the suit. Even if actual
notice should reach the wife it may be a great practical
inconvenience for her to travel the distance to the divorcing
state.
There are no compelling reasons why there should be
a federal impediment if a state, in the light of these considerations, should seek to protect a wife by permitting her
to obtain a decree of alimony after her husband's foreign
ex parte divorce. In working out, under the full faith and
credit clause, a policy which has regard for the respective
interests of the parties to a marriage, the Supreme Court
would do well to embrace the ghost of Haddock and to permit the various states an independent judgment on the question.
In 1945, Esenwein v. Esenwein"4 seemed to foretell that
the stone would be rolled from the tomb of Haddock. The
Esenwein case, handed down on the same day as Williams
//, merely decided that a previously existing order of support
in Pennsylvania could survive a Nevada divorce which was
invalid because Nevada was not the state of bona fide domicil. However, in a concurring opinion,8s Mr. Justice Douglas
suggested another ground upon which the decision could be
placed. He used broad language to mark a separation between problems of support and those of marital capacity and
legitimacy:
I think it is important to keep in mind a basic difference

between the problem of marital capacity and the problem of
support .... In other words, it is not apparent that the spouse
who obtained the decree can defeat an action for maintenance
or support in another State by showing that he was domiciled
in the State which awarded him the divorce decree ....
But I
am not convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal
service the decree need be given full faith and credit when it
comes to maintenance or support of the other spouse or the
children.86

However, in making the distinction between status and
support, Mr. Justice Douglas failed to discuss Thompson v.
Thompson,87 a case which seems to stand directly in the way
84.

325 U. S. 279 (1945).

85. Id. at 281.
86. Id. at 281-2.
87. 226 U. S. 551 (1913).
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of any attempt by the Court to adopt fully the doctrine of
"divisible divorce." 88 In the Thompson case, a wife sued her
husband in the District of Columbia for a decree of maintenance as authorized by a statute applicable in the District.
Before the maintenance decree was entered, the husband
secured a decree of judicial separation from a Virginia court.
The wife was served by publication. The District of Columbia
trial court refused to recognize the Virginia decree as valid
and allowed the wife to obtain the relief sought. The Court
of Appeals' reversal was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
which held that Virginia was the state of the "matrimonial
domicil," and as such had jurisdiction to enter the separation decree. The Virginia decree granted upon proper jurisdiction is entitled to the same faith and credit as the decree
would have by law or usage in the courts of Virginia,89 i.e.,
a decree of judicial separation bars a later suit for maintenance or support. The Court noted no distinction between
status and support in discussing the jurisdiction of Virginia.
If the Court is to make the distinction of the Esenwein
concurrence, two ways of dealing with the Thompson case
seem possible: (a) to overrule it (it should be remembered
that the case is based upon the law as it was before Williams
1) or (b) to regard it as a case which decides what effect
a Virginia decree will have in the District of Columbia as
a matter of the conflict of la'~s of the District. In the latter
event the Supreme Court would be regarded as having acted
in its capacity as the highest court for the District of Columbia, rather than as the supreme authority in respect to the
In his opinion in the Estin case Mr. Justice Douglas distinguishes
the Thompson case: "The case is unlike Thompson v. Thompson,
226 U. S. 551, where the wife by her conduct forfeited her right to
alimony under the laws of the State of the matrimonial domicile
where her husband obtained the divorce, and hence could not retain
a judgment for maintenance subsequently obtained in another jurisdiction." 334 U. S. 541, 546 note 4 (1948). If the Justice means that
the mandatory faith and credit of a divorce dperee as to matters of
support will depend upon the conduct of the parties, or if hie means
that the state of the "matrimonial domicil" has peculiar power to
act in respect to rights of support, Haddock will indeed have returned with a vengeance. See RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 113 (1934) (this section is based on an interpretation of Haddock
v. Haddock); McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction, 37 YALE L. J. 564 (1928).
89. The courts of the District of Columbia must give full faith and
credit to judicial proceedings of the states. The Statute of 1790
prescribes the effect which state court judgments are to have
".... in every court within the United States ...."

88.
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full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and the Statute
of 1790.
The promise of a complete separation between problems
of support and capacity to remarry, which was adumbrated
by Mr. Justice Douglas in Esenwein, is not fulfilled in the
present cases of Estin and Kreiger. While the Estin case
makes it clear that an ex parte decree granted in a foreign
state will not operate by virtue of the full faith and credit
clause to end an existing support order, the reasoning of the
opinion does not easily lend itself to support a sharp dichotomy
beween problems of support and status. The opinion stresses
the outstanding decree of support, which is labeled a property interest of the wife, and therefore something not to be
taken from her by a court lacking personal jurisdiction over
her. If the doctrine of "divisible divorce" really is adopted,
whether an alimony decree gives rise to a property interest
is an irrelevant consideration. In comparison with Mr.
Justice Douglas' approach in the Esenwein case, the Estin
opinion is narrow indeed.
A wife's right to alimony, not previously reduced to a
support order, will be difficult to characterize as property.
Yet should the Court prevent a state from giving an alimony
decree after an ex parte foreign divorce on the ground that
the possibility of support, undefined by a court order, is not
"property," an unfortunate and unnecessary limitation will
be placed upon the Estin case. It is the whole problem of
support, not merely a wife's right under an existing support
order, which requires separate treatment. As to support,
a court which has only the husband before it should be
unable, so far as full faith and credit is concerned, to relieve
him of his duty to provide for his wife.
Acceptable legal theory under the full faith and credit
clause easily could give each state freedom to determine the
effect of an ex parte foreign divorce decree. Judicial proceedings are entitled to full faith and credit in other states
only if the state in which they take place has the jurisdiction
to act. To accomplish the desired result the rule on jurisdiction to divorce under the full faith and credit clause might
be stated: The state which is the domicil of only one spouse
has jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage so that every other
state must recognize the capacity of the spouses to remarry
and the legitimacy of the children of a second marriage.
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However, a state which is the domicil of only one spouse does
not have jurisdiction to end a wife's claim for support in
another state unless the wife is personally before the court
in the divorcing state.
Whether the Supreme Court ultimately adopts such a
theory of jurisdiction, at the moment the advantages of obtaining a support decree as quickly as possible after the
break-up of a home should be apparent to practicing lawyers. In addition, they will surely recognize the importance
of an appearance in the strategy of litigating support cases.
A defendant wife should be advised to avoid making a personal
appearance in the divorcing state if she wishes either to safeguard her present rights under an alimony decree, or to retain
the possibility of obtaining one in the first instance after a
foreign divorce has been secured by her spouse. If she does
appear in the divorce proceeding, wise counsel will dictate
that she litigate the question of support in the divorcing
forum, for that divorce decree will probably be a bar to a
suit for alimony in another state by virtue of the full faith
and credit clause.9 0
The four cases of Sherrer, Coe, Estin and Kreiger operate to give the parties to a marriage a choice in the effectiveness of their divorce. If both appear the divorce will be
binding on the parties as to status but the opportunity to
obtain subsequent support may be lost. If only one party
is personally before the court the proceeding may be challenged in other states on the ground that the divorcing court
had no power to dissolve the marriage for any purpose. However, rights of support may still exist even though the divorce
should otherwise prove to be valid.
90.

This assumes the decree is a bar in the divorcing state. See note 75
supra.

